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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-appellant was injured while stopped in her car 
at a red light by defendant-respondent's truck crashing into 
her vehicle from the rear. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BELOW 
The matter came on for trial on November 29, 1979. Sum-
mary Judgment was granted at the closing of evidence as to 
defendant's liability. Damages were returned by the jury in 
the amount of $1,000 general damages, medicals in the sum of 
$688 and minimal loss of earnings in the amount of $100. Sub-
sequently, plaintiff-appellant's Motion for Additur or New 
Trial Based on Inadequate Damages was denied by the trial court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Plaintiff-appellant seeks an order requiring a new trial 
on which plaintiff-appellant's damages may be awarded as estab-
lished by the evidence, unless defendant-respondent agrees to 
additur in an amount found by this court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The issues of liability were sufficiently clear that the 
court directed a verdict in favor of plaintiff at the conclu-
sion of evidence. 
During the afternoon of December 7, 1977, plaintiff-
appellant was driving south on Redwood Road approaching other 
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southbound traffic stopped for a light at 35th South. She 
stopped without incident. Traveling behind her, defendant-
respondent failed to react to her stopping, applied his brakes 
belatedly and struck the rear of her car with his pick-up 
truck. She was knocked unconscious, came to, and passed out 
again. (Tr. P6, L6-20- P9, Ll4-24) She was taken by ambu-
lance to the Valley West Hospital where she was later released 
that day. (Tr. PlO, L2 4-Pll, L2) 
Subsequent to the accident, she received medical treat-
ment for injuries arising from the accident from her family 
physician, Dr. Isaacson, until he left private practice, and 
then from an orthopedic specialist, Dr. Thomas Soderberg. 
She has also received physical therapy from Larry Brown, R.P.T., 
and therapy from a chiropractor, Dr. Jean Wayman. 
After the accident, she continued to work through Decem-
ber and January, and then upon advice of her doctor, and the work 
related pain, and inability to do her work safely, she left her 
employment to convalesce. (Tr. P29, L5-P31, LlO) She was out 
of work from January 13, 1978, through May 20, 1978. Since the 
date of the accident, she has been unable to maintain a job 
as a driver, a skill she is proud of, a skill that has paid her 
more than other jobs she has maintained. Her experience included 
stockcar racing and truck driving. She can build an engine. 
(Tr. P34, Ll4-22) 
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Her wage losses were approximately $800 for 15 weeks lost 
at $3.55 an hour (Tr. P28, L26) at approximately 110 hours 
every four weeks. (Tr. P27, Lll). 
There was no contradicting testimony to appellant's evi-
dence concerning her injuries. 
Appellant described as extreme the pain she felt imme-
diately following the impact (Tr. P9, LlS-PlO, L23). This was 
the only point of contradiction, defendan~ testifying that she 
didn't seem to be in trouble at the accident scene. 
She also testified that she had to give up the employment 
she then had as a bus driver because operating the bus put her 
in pain and, even worse, limitation in moving her head to see 
other traffic caused her to scrape the bus twice against other 
cars. She gave up that job voluntarily after the second acci-
dent. (Tr. P31, L4-10) At time of trial, she had become self-
employed, with her husband, painting signs. She had pain doing 
many of the mechanical requirements of this, and was substan-
tially limited in her ability to work for continuous periods 
as the pain progressed with certain kinds of activities. (Tr. 
P40, Ll-P41, Ll7) Finally, she described the pain she felt 
at time of trial as being repeated headaches, pain caused by 
activities involving bending her neck, and painful difficulty 
in such simple activities as opening jars and dressing herself. 
(Tr. P41, Ll3-P42,L4). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT CAN DIRECTLY 
REACH THE HEART OF RULE 59, UTAH RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AND ORDER ADDITUR 
WHEN APPROPRIATE. 
The pertinent points of Rule 59 are as follows: 
11 A. Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, 
a new trial may be granted to all or any of the 
parties and on all or part of the issues, for any 
of the following causes: 
11 !(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appear-
ing to have been given under the influence of passion 
or prejudice and, 
"(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify 
the verdict or other decision, or that it is against 
the law. 11 
Can the Utah Supreme Court directly address the issue of 
a jury verdict which inadequately compensates a plaintiff? In 
Bodon v. Suhrmann, 8 U2d 42, 327 P2d 826, at 2d 47, the Court 
answered: 
"Nevertheless, when the verdict is outside the limits 
of any reasonable appraisal of damages as shown by 
the evidence, it should not be permitted to stand, 
and if the trial court fails to rectify it, we are 
obliged to make the correction on appeal." 
There the plaintiff was awarded the "munificent" sum of 
what added up to $31 for two weeks illness from eating sausage 
negligently prepared by the defendant Suhrmann. The Supreme 
Court ordered additur. 
Where does the court derive such power? 
"In such instances, the courts exercise their inher-
ent supervisory powers over jury ~erd~cts~ which de-
rive from their duty to see that JUSt1ce is done; and 
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make corrective orders necessary for that purpose. 
This is done by the trial court, or upon its failure 
to do so, by this court on appeal." id. U2d 45. 
In accord see King v. Union Pac. R. Co., 117 u 40, 12 P2d 
692 and Brown v. Johnson, 24 U2d 388, 472 P2d 942. 
Appellant's medical testimony was given by a specialist in 
orthopedics. He testified that she would have a permanent 10% 
degree of disability resulting solely, proximately and directly 
from the subject accident. The disability would be inherently 
painful. In fact, he testified that the presence of pain as 
appellant attempted to move would be the primary factor in limit-
ing her freedom of movement. Appellant has sustained pain ever 
since the accident occurred caused by the accident. (Tr. P29, 
L6-Pl07, L26) 
Notwithstanding this evidence, the jury awarded $1,000 in 
general damages. Such an award could not cover to a small degree 
pain to date of trial. It would not at all begin to cover an 
award for a permanent and painful disability for appellant's 30 
year life expectancy. Clearly, the jury verdict does not relate 
to this evidence. It had to reject it and substitute its own 
conclusion that plaintiff wasn't injured to any real degree past 
or future. Is the law and evidence such that the verdict should 
stand? 
POINT II. 
THE CRITERIA FOR SETTING ASIDE JURY 
VERDICTS JUSTIFY ADDITUR OR NEW TRIAL. 
Evidence cannot be precisely measured and jurors are bound 
to have disparate views of the same evidence as noted by Justice 
Crockett in his concurrence in Holmes v. Nelson, 7 U2d at 435, 
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326 P2d 722. 
But there the main opinion viewed the evidence and held: 
"We are of the opinion that this accident never should 
have happened; it was preventable. A careful review of 
the evidence leads us to the conclusion that defendant 
either did not see this child when he said he did, or 
was not going as slowly as he claims he was, or that 
he failed to do everything possible to avoid striking 
plaintiff by bringing his car to a stop as soon as 
possible or by turning to the right." id. U2d 438. 
Therefore, the court could say that: 
"Here we are hot confronted with evidence that is equ-
ally convincing in its weight. In this case, the demand 
of Rule 59(a) is fully satisfied--the evidence is in-
sufficient to sustain the verdict." 
Jury verdict was then reversed. 
The Utah Supreme Court identified the elements to be con-
sidered in modifying a verdict as a matter of law in Jensen v. 
D & RG Ry Co, 44 U 100, 138 P 1185. There, in addressing the 
trial court's obligations at post trial motions, the court 
stated that the verdict should be corrected where it was "clear 
that the jury has misapplied or failed to take into account 
proven facts, or has made findings clearly against the weight 
of the evidence, so that the verdict is offensive to his sense 
of justice to the extent he cannot permit it in conscience to 
stand." 
Jensen dealt with a jury verdict both in areas of liabil-
ity and damages. 
Looking at cases on damages, in Paul v. Kirkendall, 
1 U2d 1, 261 P2d 670, this court reaffirmed its position saying: 
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"If inadequacy or excessiveness of the verdict ... 
shows a disregard ... of the evidence or the instruc-
tions ... such as to satisfy the court that the ver-
dict was rendered under such disregard or misappre-
hen~ion of the evidence or influence of passion or 
prejudice, then the court may exercise its discretion 
in the interest of justice and grant a new trial." 
Also in accord is Saltas v. Affleck, 99 U 381, 105 P2d 
176, wherein a jury award of $800 for the death of plaintiff's 
son was increased by additur to $2,400. 
POINT III. 
THE CRITERIA FOR SETTING ASIDE JURY 
VERDICT DEMAND ACTION IN THIS CASE 
BASED UPON THE EVIDENCE. 
Appellant does not hide from the fact that appellate 
courts are reluctant to overturn decisions based upon the find-
ings of a trier of fact. In this case, what other facts are 
there on damages? None. To find that the evidence supporting 
her case is not credible is to find that she is not credible, 
her son is not credible, and Dr. Thomas E. Soderberg is not 
credible. 
Defendant made no effort to bring any doctor, neighbor 
or investigator to limit, rebut or impeach a word of their 
testimony. 
In some cases, no rebuttal is necessary, claims fall of 
their own weight for various reasons such as impeachment, 
absurdity and so on, but here no factual reasons are in the 
record, nor credibly implied from it. 
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The verdict is simply contrary to the evidence and, as 
such, denies appellant the "fair and adequate" compensation 
wrongdoers are required to pay their victims,and should be 
reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
There is not an issue of liability. There is not an 
issue of causal relation of damages. For such as they are, 
they were awarded by the jury. This issue is simply whether 
the amount of damages awarded by the jury is in accordance 
with the evidence. Plaintiff-appellant maintains that an 
award of $1,000 for damages in which she has already suffered 
pain for two years preceding the trial and from all the medi-
cal evidence at trial, will suffer pain in the future, is such 
a "munificent" sum as to require this court to fulfill the 
duty neglected by the trial court. There should be either 
additure or a new trial. Rule 59 and its interpretive cases 
require it. 
DATED May 8, 1980. 
JAMES E. HAWKES 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Mailed 3 OJpiesof the foregoing Appellant's Brief to 
Frank N. Karras, attorney for defendant-respondent, 321 South 
600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, May 8, 1980. 
Hazel Sykes 
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